A Cure for Every Ill? Remedies for “Pathological” Arbitration Clauses by Samra, Harout J. & Ramachanderan, Ramya
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 74 
Number 4 Eleventh Circuit Issue Article 6 
6-23-2020 
A Cure for Every Ill? Remedies for “Pathological” Arbitration 
Clauses 
Harout J. Samra 
Ramya Ramachanderan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, 
and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Harout J. Samra and Ramya Ramachanderan, A Cure for Every Ill? Remedies for “Pathological” Arbitration 
Clauses, 74 U. Miami L. Rev. 1110 (2020) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol74/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 




A Cure for Every Ill? 
Remedies for “Pathological” Arbitration 
Clauses 
HAROUT J. SAMRA & RAMYA RAMACHANDERAN* 
Defective arbitration and dispute resolution clauses—
widely called “pathological clauses”—may undermine par-
ties’ intent to seek recourse to arbitration rather than the 
courts. Questions concerning the existence and validity of 
arbitration clauses are subject to state contract law despite 
the wide sweep of the Federal Arbitration Act. This Article 
examines selected common “pathologies” and reviews re-
cent court decisions, including from the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals and its constituent federal district courts, 
concerning the enforcement of such clauses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Carefully drafted dispute resolution clauses in a contract are in-
tegral to facilitating transactions between parties but are often ne-
glected in the negotiation process. Parties and their counsel invest 
significant time and resources to define their commercial relation-
ship in their agreements, but sometimes fail to give the same care—
or seek expert advice—when crafting a mechanism for resolving 
disputes.1 Whether prompted by exhaustion (i.e., “midnight 
clauses”) or other influences (i.e., “champagne clauses”),2 poorly 
drafted dispute resolution clauses frequently trap parties in a less 
than optimal dispute resolution process. In some cases, the clauses 
are so poorly drafted that they are internally inconsistent or other-
wise suffer from defects that may make them cumbersome or even, 
in the worst of scenarios, unenforceable.3 Frédéric Eisemann, the 
former Secretary-General of what is today the International Cham-
ber of Commerce’s (“ICC”) International Court of Arbitration, fa-
mously—and aptly—called such provisions “pathological.”4 
Since his 1974 article on the subject, other scholars have dis-
cussed Eisemann’s analysis of arbitration clauses with various errors 
or “pathologies” and his assertion that an arbitration clause must ful-
fill four essential functions: (1) produce mandatory consequences 
for the parties; (2) exclude the intervention of State courts in the 
settlement of the disputes, at least before the issuance of the award; 
(3) give powers to the arbitrators to resolve the disputes likely to 
arise between the parties; and (4) implement a procedure which fos-
ters the best conditions of efficiency and speed resulting in a final 
award that is susceptible to judicial enforcement.5 These four 
 
 1 Nancy Holtz, Beware the Midnight Clause: Hold the Champagne?, JAMS 
(Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/documents/ 
articles/holtz-insidecounsel.com-beware-the-midnight-clause.pdf. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Adam Stone & Kaytie Pickett, When Less Is More: The Dangers of Multi-
ple Inconsistent Arbitration Agreements, ABA (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.amer-
icanbar.org/groups/construction_industry/publications/under_construc-
tion/2018/fall/arbitration-agreements/. 
 4 Frédéric Eisemann, La Clause D’arbitrage Pathologique, in COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORIAM EUGENIO MINOLI 129, 129–30 (1974). 
 5 Benjamin G. Davis, Pathological Clauses: Frédéric Eisemann’s Still Vital 
Criteria, 7 ARB. INT’L 365, 366 (1991). 
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elements, summarized here, have been used as the guiding princi-
ples for users and counsel advising or drafting arbitration clauses. 
However, the practice of arbitration cannot be separated from 
the context of a domestic legal regime. For instance, while the 
United States has a federal policy that favors arbitration, the validity 
of arbitration clauses is governed by state contract law.6 This fact 
does not conflict with the supremacy of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”), which has been repeatedly held to pre-empt any State law 
on arbitration.7 As a general matter, 
[t]he FAA applies to the parties’ agreement to arbi-
trate disputes whether or not it is expressly men-
tioned in that agreement – and is presumed to 
preempt the state law selected in a general choice-of-
law provision unless the contract expressly evi-
dences the parties’ clear intent that state arbitration 
law applies in place of or in addition to the FAA.8 
However, “[w]hen federal courts interpret arbitration agree-
ments, state contract law governs and directs the courts’ analyses of 
whether the parties committed an issue to arbitration.”9 Therefore, 
while the FAA governs the arbitration clause, its existence is deter-
mined by state law concerning the construction and interpretation of 
contracts.10 
As we explain below, the Eleventh Circuit, in line with the ma-
jority of Circuit Courts, has adopted the integral provision rule to 
determine whether a defect in an arbitration clause is so fundamental 
to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate that it has the effect of render-
ing the agreement unenforceable.11 However, how the court has 
 
 6 See Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017). 
 7 Terry L. Trantina, What Law Applies to an Agreement to Arbitrate?, DISP. 
RESOL. MAG., Fall 2015, at 29. 
 8 Id. (emphasis removed); see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hut-
ton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62–64 (1995). 
 9 Parnell v. CashCall, Inc., 804 F.3d 1142, 1147 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing First 
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)); see Paladino v. Avnet 
Comp. Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1057 (11th Cir. 1998) (applying “basic prin-
ciples of contract interpretation in harmony with a general federal policy in favor 
of arbitration”). 
 10 See Kindred Nursing, 137 S. Ct. at 1426. 
 11 See infra notes 51–55. 
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applied the rule raises questions regarding whether it may be applied 
more broadly in a consistent and predictable manner.12 This Article 
concludes that in light of the integral provision rule, parties should 
carefully draft arbitration agreements and avoid boilerplate content 
prone to pathological defects that may render the dispute resolution 
clause void. 
I. FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION AND THE TEST 
USED BY COURTS 
U.S. courts were for many years infamous for decisions that 
thwarted arbitration agreements between disputants. In many cases, 
the courts simply refused to enforce arbitration agreements.13 As a 
result, arbitration in the United States faced significant growing 
pains, particularly in the early twentieth century.   
Initially, courts refused to enforce arbitration agreements, argu-
ing that an agreement to arbitrate refused the right of every “citi-
zen . . . to resort to all the courts of the country.”14 This was coupled 
with what is referred to as the “revocability doctrine,” in which the 
courts refused to compel arbitration by allowing either party to the 
arbitration to revoke its agreement.15 Courts broadly adopted the 
view that arbitration—as a process—failed to provide adequate safe-
guards.16 As a consequence, judges in this era envisioned a more 
active role for the justice system to protect citizens’ rights of access 
to the courts.17 The consequence of this judicial paternalism, 
 
 12 See id. 
 13 See generally Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose 
of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 92 n.4, 97 (2012) 
(citing Headley v. Aetna Ins. Co., 80 So. 466, 467 (Ala. 1918) (an agreement to 
arbitrate for disputes from the contract was universally held to be void, as against 
public policy); Rison v. Moon, 22 S.E. 165, 167 (Va. 1895) (holding that either 
party to an agreement to arbitrate may withdraw from it before the award is ren-
dered)). 
 14 Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874). 
 15 Charles Newton Hulvey, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, 15 VA. L. 
REV. 238, 239 (1929). 
 16 See id. at 242. 
 17 See generally KATHERINE V.W. STONE & RICHARD A. BALES, 
ARBITRATION LAW 22 (2d ed. 2010). 
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however, was that parties were deprived of contractual autonomy 
and agency. 
In the face of this judicial skepticism, Congress enacted and 
President Coolidge signed the FAA in 1925 to rejuvenate party au-
tonomy by ensuring that agreements to arbitrate were enforced.18 
Thus, the first step in the rehabilitation of arbitration in the United 
States was to recognize that arbitration agreements were contracts 
in themselves and that parties had a right to enforce them as such. 
Indeed, the FAA’s purpose is to “quell judicial hostility by mandat-
ing that arbitration agreements be enforced on the same footing as 
other contracts.”19 As with all things, however, it took decades until 
the significance of the FAA was truly felt.20 
In 1983, the Supreme Court held that as a matter of federal pol-
icy any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration.21 To this end, the Court explained 
the FAA was a “congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements.”22 This clear pro-arbitration policy 
has been a hallmark of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the 
subsequent decades.23 From this newfound enthusiasm for arbitra-
tion, a presumption of “a national policy” in favor of arbitration has 
emerged and influences every aspect of arbitration jurisprudence, 
 
 18 See 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924); see also THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE 
LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 114–15 (3d ed. 2009) (observing that leg-
islative history shows that the FAA was enacted to allow the enforcement of or-
dinary contractual rights). 
 19 Wilson, supra note 13, at 101 (citing H.R. REP. No. 68–96, at 1 (1924)). 
 20 See generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 
395, 403–04 (1967) (holding that an arbitration agreement is separable from the 
rest of the contract and is subject to independent assessment by the court and in-
troducing the “separability doctrine”). 
 21 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25–26 
(1983). 
 22 Id. at 24. 
 23 See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1984); Volt 
Info. Sci., Inc., v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 
(1989); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 53–56 
(1995); Hall Street Associates, LL.C v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581–84 (2006); 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
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including, as will be seen, the enforcement of arbitration clauses suf-
fering from defects or pathologies.24 
The Supreme Court outlined the process courts must undertake 
when considering whether to enforce an arbitration provision in 
Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc..25 
The Court established a two-step inquiry that courts must administer 
to determine whether parties must submit the dispute to arbitration 
in light of the clause in the contract.26 First, the court must determine 
whether the parties agreed for the dispute to be ultimately settled by 
arbitration.27 Two pivotal considerations guide this analysis: (1) 
whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, and (2) whether the 
dispute falls within the arbitration agreement.28 Second, the court 
must analyze whether there are legal constraints external to the par-
ties’ agreement which foreclose the arbitration of claims being 
made.29 Thus, the clear federal policy favoring arbitration remains 
susceptible to state laws of contract construction to determine the 
parties’ intentions, taking into consideration the strong policy in fa-
vor of arbitration.30 
II. DRAFTING ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
A well-drafted, clear arbitration clause ensures—or at least fos-
ters—efficient dispute resolution and highlights the parties’ clear in-
tention to submit any dispute arising from or related to the agree-
ment to arbitration.31 Indeed, the core purpose of an arbitration 
 
 24 See, e.g., Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336–39; Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. 
Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 65–66 (2010); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 
546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). 
 25 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); see also Rivera v. United HealthCare Serv., Inc., 
No. 8:17-CV-1409-T-33TBM, 2018 WL 623677, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2018) 
(describing the Supreme Court’s process for determining whether a matter must 
be submitted to arbitration). 
 26 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. 
 27 Id. at 626. 
 28 Id.; see also Rivera, 2018 WL 623677, at *2 (quoting Fleetwood Enter., 
Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 2002)). 
 29 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. 
 30 See, e.g., Delano v. Mastec, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-320-T-27MAP, 2010 WL 
4809081, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2010). 
 31 See Davis, supra note 5, at 365–66; see also, JEFFREY MAURICE 
WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 129–
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clause is to clearly communicate the parties’ intention to resolve all 
disputes finally through arbitration without recourse to a court of 
law on the merits of the dispute.32 This definition is in tune with the 
requirements posed by Eisemann.33 Failing this, the agreement is 
pathological.34 Scholars and practitioners have identified several 
types of pathological arbitration clauses.35 These defects are best 
avoided by careful construction before a dispute arises.36 Although 
parties have the ability to enter into agreements after a dispute arises, 
such a solution is often fraught and subject to new and special con-
siderations of party advantage.37 
Generally, arbitration clauses are upheld as valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable unless defeated by “generally applicable contract 
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”38 As a result, 
when faced with a poorly drafted or defective arbitration clause, the 
courts must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dis-
pute notwithstanding the poor drafting of the clause.39 To do so, 
courts analyze of all the circumstances surrounding the arbitration 
agreement to determine whether the parties both had or should have 
had knowledge of the clause, were capable of entering into the 
agreement, whether the arbitration agreement suffers 
 
30 (2012) (describing the importance of the language of an arbitration clause and 
explaining the essential components of an arbitration agreement); Holtz, supra 
note 1 (explaining that carefully drafted arbitration clauses can best meet the 
needs and reflect the intentions of the parties to a contract). 
 32 See Davis, supra note 5, at 366; see also WAINCYMER, supra note 31, at 
129–130 (“Arbitration by its essential nature is based on an agreement between 
the parties to submit their dispute to binding and final adjudication by an identifi-
able tribunal.”). 
 33 See Davis, supra note 5, at 366. 
 34 See id. at 365–66. 
 35 See generally John M. Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses: Avoiding 
the 7 Deadly Sins, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 2003, at 29 and passim. 
 36 See generally Holtz, supra note 1 (explaining the importance of a well-
drafted arbitration clause). 
 37 See, e.g., PIETRO ORTOLANI & DONNA SHESTOWSKY, THE ROLES OF 
PSYCHOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 133–34 (2017) (analyzing the 
reasons why post-dispute arbitration agreements are typically disfavored by par-
ties). 
 38 Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (quoting Doc-
tor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). 
 39 See id. at 67–73. 
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unconscionability, whether the forum in the agreement is available, 
etc.40 The following Section assesses recent decisions by the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals and the district courts located within 
the Circuit in which the courts were confronted with the question of 
whether to enforce arbitration agreements that suffered from com-
mon pathologies, including unavailable fora and non-existing sub-
stantive law. 
III. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF PATHOLOGICAL ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS 
A. Unavailable Forum 
In Parm v. National Bank of California, N.A., the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was confronted with an arbitration agreement 
that required parties to arbitrate in an unavailable forum.41 The ap-
pellee had entered into a payday loan agreement, which provided for 
arbitration conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation in 
accordance with its consumer dispute rules and the terms of the loan 
agreement.42 The arbitration agreement in the contract, in full, pro-
vided the following: 
Agreement to Arbitrate. You agree that any Dispute, 
except as provided below, will be resolved by Arbi-
tration, which shall be conducted by the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Tribal Nation by an authorized repre-
sentative in accordance with its consumer dispute 
rules and the terms of this Agreement. 
Arbitration Defined. Arbitration is a means of having 
an independent third party resolve a Dispute. A “Dis-
pute” is any controversy or claim between you and 
Western Sky or the holder or servicer of the Note. 
The term Dispute is to be given its broadest possible 
meaning and includes, without limitation, all claims 
or demands (whether past, present, or future, 
 
 40 See id. 
 41 835 F.3d 1331, 1332 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 42 Id. at 1333. 
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including events that occurred prior to the opening of 
this Account), based on any legal or equitable theory 
(tort, contract, or otherwise), and regardless of the 
type of relief sought (i.e. money, injunctive relief, or 
declaratory relief). A Dispute includes, by way of ex-
ample and without limitation, any claim based upon 
marketing or solicitations to obtain the loan and the 
handling or servicing of my account whether such 
Dispute is based on a tribal, federal or state constitu-
tion, statute, ordinance, regulation, or common law, 
and including any issue concerning the validity, en-
forceability, or scope of this loan or the Arbitration 
agreement. 
Choice of arbitrator. [ . . . ] [Ms. Parm] shall have 
the right to select any of the following arbitration or-
ganizations to administer the arbitration: the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association [ . . . ]; JAMS [ . . . ]; or 
an arbitration organization agreed upon by you and 
the other parties to the Dispute. The arbitration will 
be governed by the chosen arbitration organization’s 
rules and procedures applicable to consumer dis-
putes, to the extent that those rules and procedures do 
not contradict either the law of the Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe or the express terms of this Agreement 
to Arbitrate.43 
When the appellee sought to initiate a class action, the appellant 
financial institution sought to enforce the arbitration agreement.44 
However, the district court declined to do so, finding that the arbi-
tration agreement was unenforceable because, in part, it required the 
parties to arbitrate in an unavailable forum.45 
The court first noted its prior binding precedent, Inetianbor v. 
CashCall, Inc.,46 in which the court was faced with a very similar 
arbitration provision involving the same financial institution.47 In 
 
 43 Id. at 1333–34. 
 44 Id. at 1334. 
 45 Id. 
 46 768 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 47 Parm, 835 F.3d at 1335. 
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Inetianbor, the arbitration agreement also called for arbitration 
“conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe,” but noted that such 
arbitration should be in accordance with its “consumer dispute 
rules.”48 However, the court concluded that the “consumer dispute 
rules” did not exist and the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe “does not 
authorize Arbitration.”49 Underscoring the latter point, the arbitrator 
that CashCall attempted to appoint stated that the agreement was “a 
private business deal” and added that “[t]he Tribe has nothing to do 
with any of this business.”50 
Citing its prior precedent in Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial 
Corporation,51 the Inetianbor court analyzed the arbitration agree-
ment in light of the “integral provision rule,” which provides that 
the agreement will be rendered unenforceable if an “integral part of 
the agreement to arbitrate”—for example, the choice of forum—
fails.52 The court in Inetianbor thus declined to enforce the arbitra-
tion agreement, concluding that the parties’ selection of the Chey-
enne River Sioux Tribe as the entity that would resolve the dispute 
was integral to their agreement, and that such forum was unavaila-
ble.53 
In Inetianbor the court noted that while majority of circuits, spe-
cifically the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth, followed the integral 
provision rule, the rule had been subject to significant criticism in 
the Seventh Circuit.54 In Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, the 
Seventh Circuit held that, when faced with a failure to select an 
available forum, the “[c]ourts should not use uncertainty in just how 
[an arbitration] would be accomplished to defeat the evident 
choice,” but instead use the power available under § 5 of the FAA 
to “supply details in order to make arbitration work” by “ap-
point[ing] an arbitrator.”55 
Notably, the court in Inetianbor distinguished Brown, the very 
case in which the Eleventh Circuit first adopted the integral 
 
 48 Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1348. 
 49 Id. at 1354. 
 50 Id. 
 51 211 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 52 Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1350. 
 53 Id. at 1354. 
 54 Id. at 1350 & n.1. 
 55 724 F.3d 787, 793 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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provision rule.56 In Brown, the arbitration agreement provided for 
binding arbitration “under the Code of Procedure of the National 
Arbitration Forum.”57 However, by the time the dispute arose, the 
National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) no longer existed.58 Neverthe-
less, the court concluded that “[t]he unavailability of the NAF does 
not destroy the arbitration clause” because there was “no evidence 
that the choice of the NAF as the arbitration forum was an integral 
part of the agreement to arbitrate” and that this defect, in any event, 
could be cured by the court naming the arbitrator pursuant to 9 
U.S.C. § 5.59 The court in Inetianbor noted that “[t]his case is quite 
unlike Brown, where this Court applied the integral provision rule 
but permitted substitution pursuant to §5” because, “[i]n Brown, the 
arbitration agreement provided for the procedural rules only,” 
whereas the agreement in Inetianbor selected “not just the rules of 
procedure, but also the arbitral forum.”60 
Revisiting this issue in Parm, the court once again applied the 
integral provision rule.61 Though the arbitration agreements were 
substantially similar, the agreement in Parm also provided “the op-
tion to select the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) or 
JAMS  . . .  as neutral arbitral fora” to “to administer the arbitra-
tion.”62 The court applied the “plain-meaning” rule of contract con-
struction under Georgia law.63 Concluding that the reference to the 
AAA and JAMS in the agreement “only provides an administrative 
vehicle to appoint the CRST arbitrator and does not affect the im-
portance of the CRST forum in the agreement,” the court noted that 
it could not distinguish the agreement from Inetianbor and that the 
agreement was, therefore, not enforceable.64 
 
 56 Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1351. 
 57 Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 
2000). 
 58 Id. at 1220–21. 
 59 Id. at 1222. 
 60 Inetianbor, 768 F.3d at 1351. 
 61 See Parm v. Nat’l Bank of Cal., 835 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 62 Id. at 1333, 1335. 
 63 Id. at 1335. 
 64 Id. at 1338. 
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B. Non-Existing Substantive Law 
In Parnell v. Cashcall, Inc., a plaintiff once again challenged the 
validity of the arbitration clause contained in a loan agreement with 
Western Sky Financial, LLC that was virtually identical to the arbi-
tration agreements at issue in Parm and Inetianbor.65 In addition to 
analyzing the selection of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation 
as the forum for the arbitration, the district court also considered the 
choice of law provision, which provided that “[t]he arbitrator will 
apply the laws of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation and the 
terms of this Agreement.”66 Significantly, the court determined that 
it was “not clear that the Tribe even has any laws governing the en-
forceability of contracts.”67 As a result, the court stated that the 
plaintiff would be left with “little to no ability to determine what 
substantive law would govern the Agreement at an arbitration, even 
if the dispute resolution rules of an arbitration organization can gov-
ern the conduct of the arbitration proceeding itself.”68 This “contra-
dictory and confusing” language was part of an effort, the court con-
cluded, to “convert a choice of law clause into a choice of no law 
clause.”69 The court declined to enforce the arbitration agreement 
considering the unavailability of the forum in combination with the 
broader unconscionability of the arbitration agreement.70 
CONCLUSION 
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach to resolving the challenge of 
“pathological” arbitration clauses, particularly after Inetianbor, 
raises several important questions. First, the practical consequence 
of the court’s analysis is difficult to assess beyond the particular cir-
cumstances of those cases, which assessed the question of an una-
vailable forum. Beyond this context, it is difficult to extract a gen-
eral principle for application. In Green, Judge Easterbrook high-
lighted this challenge as a practical matter for judicial determination 
and asked “[h]ow could a district judge tell what is ‘integral’ without 
 
 65 Parnell v. Cashcall, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1030 (N.D. Ga. 2016). 
 66 Id. at 1040. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 1042–43. 
 70 Id. at 1044. 
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a trial at which parties testify about what was important to them and 
lawyers present data about questions such as whether consumers or 
businesses shifted from arbitration to litigation when the Forum 
stopped accepting new consumer disputes for resolution?”71 Absent 
such an inquiry, the analysis may be reduced little more than a par-
ody of Justice Stewart’s definition of obscenity—“I know it when I 
see it.”72 
Second, the court’s distinction of Brown in Inetianbor may ele-
vate form over substance, especially in light of the hasty manner in 
which arbitration agreements frequently are negotiated and 
drafted.73 For example, a provision calling for “arbitration under the 
rules of” an institution which does not exist would be enforceable, 
but a provision providing for “arbitration by” the same non-existent 
institution would not be enforceable. Under the court’s stated ap-
proach, the latter would be an integral provision, but the former 
would not.74 
Such decisions have serious and long-reaching consequences. 
Parm and Inetianbor highlight two frequent challenges when draft-
ing arbitration agreements. First, parties commonly utilize templates 
for dispute resolution agreements. As a result, when an arbitration 
agreement suffers from some pathology that renders it unenforcea-
ble, the problem risks cascading when that agreement, or substan-
tially similar agreements, have been used repeatedly in numerous 
contracts. Consider, for example, that in 2018, the Third Circuit 
heard a challenge to an arbitration agreement nearly identical to 
those at issue in Parm (2016) and Inetianbor (2014).75  This is the 
consequence of the repeated use of a single defective arbitration 
agreement. Second, and compounding the first point above, parties 
draft agreements long before disputes arise and, as a consequence, 
sometimes face new legal developments that make established 
 
 71 Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Ill., 724 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 72 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 73 See Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 74 See id. at 1351–53. 
 75 MacDonald v. CashCall, Inc., 883 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2018). See also 
Parm v. Nat’l Bank of Cal., 835 F.3d 1331, 1333–34 (11th Cir. 2016); Inetianbor, 
768 F.3d at 1346. 
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arbitration agreements unenforceable.76 As a consequence, parties 
must be cautious not only to thoroughly vet their draft arbitration 
agreements, but should also be as attentive as possible to legal de-
velopments that might render their arbitration agreements unen-
forceable in the future. 
 
 
 76 See, e.g., Parm, 835 F.3d at 1337 (noting that “the agreement in [Parm] 
was executed more than four months before even the district court held that the 
agreement in the Inetianbor case was void”). 
